首先要解决的是莫德里奇的去留问题，阿莫林在近期内部会议中明确表示希望留下克罗地亚人。

1、熊猫体育 随着更多车辆驶入15万公里以上的里程区间，故障车辆数还会增加。

从追赛事、刷热点，到与朋友相聚看球、分享欢呼时刻，消费者正以更多元的方式参与世界杯。熊猫体育” 张立华可能是中国最懂物理引擎的人。

2、曝66岁演员王侃去世！原因曝光，牛犇白发人送黑发人，遗照太心酸

阵型主打4-3-3控球体系。

3、XBOX测试新功能 对库存游戏增加广告并免费云游

疑点二：实控人资金拆借，财务内控形同虚设？ 大额分红之余，实控人还有其他资金运作也值得关注。

4、FIBA官方最新排名：中国男篮跌至世界第30+亚洲第5 美国稳居第一

"我一直这么说，为国夺冠是足球世界里最美妙的事，尤其是世界杯，"罗德里说道，"我们这代人从小看着卡西利亚斯和伊涅斯塔举起奖杯长大，如今我们也能做到，这是足球运动员所能达成的最高成就。

5、落地杭州万象城，喜茶杭州首家喜拉朵实验室正式开业

行业共识已清晰：2026年拼产线、拼验证；2027年拼装车、拼示范；2030年前后才是大规模商业化的时间窗口。

埃梅里的球队下赛季将征战欧冠联赛，能够为莱奥提供顶级赛事平台，这一点比此前唯一表达兴趣的加拉塔萨雷更具吸引力。

优先级最高的是卡雷查斯。

6、台风“红霞”逼近粤闽沿海 多部门启动应急响应

阿莱格里近来开始频繁使用21岁的瑞士小将，在对阵维罗纳时甚至安排他首发出场。

未来，规模化脑电采集技术将持续沉淀数据，用于训练神经基础模型。

7、张雪赢了！江门，怎么就火了？

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

巴萨的态度是：想谈，总价可以聊到1.2亿，但前提是马竞愿意回来谈。

8、推币机也能下副本了？《古钱推币机外传》8月13日发售，支持4人联机打Boss

有意思的是，“主体性”本来是一个颇有哲学含量的概念，现在已经变成了生活方式赛道的常用词。

那时，中国半导体设备产业面临的最大问题，是很难形成商业闭环。

他认为，从市场化的角度来说，一定是两条腿走路。

9、潍坊寒亭：开展“非遗传拓”体验活动 感受非遗技艺独特魅力

尽管即将年满41岁，但魔笛在攻防转换中的决策能力及定位球处理能力仍是顶级。

在对手顽强抵抗、比赛悬念保持到最后一刻的情况下，控球率高达68%，射门17-5，射正5-2，他们能够顶住压力，用控球优势，用绝杀的方式拿下比赛，这正是一支冠军球队应有的气质。

10、甘比背200万爱马仕吃路边摊：为什么身价越高，越接地气？

随着阿莫林上任AC米兰主帅，球队夏窗的引援工作开始提速。

7月17日iMoochi的正式上线，以1699元的售价（云朵充电底座套装1778元）卡位中端市场，标志着手机厂商对这一赛道的正式“宣战”。

1、比赛日

不过，现阶段仍然有很多工作要做，比如异构GPU架构的适配，以及更多生态伙伴共同支持。

2、0+0+0！郭昊文离队！再见了，NBA

这笔纯账面利润的入账，虽然缓解了俱乐部的财政压力，但也迫使维拉必须在接下来的转会窗口中重新评估阵容厚度，尤其是在中场位置面临人员流失的情况下，如何填补蒂莱曼斯留下的空缺将成为主帅埃梅里亟待解决的难题。

3、鹤壁：打造全国资源型城市绿色低碳转型样板

极致的资源优势，造就了天齐锂业简单直白的商业模式：采矿、炼锂、销售。两度顽强扳平！加时昂首出局，让世界记住佛得角！从整体实力来看，英格兰的FIFA排名第4位，高于墨西哥的第10位，13.6亿欧元的阵容档次也高于墨西哥的1.92亿欧元。

4、纪录片导演赵琦答闪电新闻记者问：并不存在真正的感同身受 “热泪盈眶”的本质其实是自怜自艾

根据最新的国际足联排名，中国男足位列世界第91位、亚洲第13位。

5、央视点名马龙，男双夺冠释放三大强烈信号

这支南美劲旅球星质量更高，利物浦边锋路易斯·迪亚斯是球队的边路爆破点，一对一突破能力极强，对阵加纳时完成11次突破，多次制造杀机。

6、感受艺术和科技！这场属于新就业群体子女的游学走进南科大

年底35万片月产能是否如期达成，Q4位元出货量份额能否突破10%。

我很难用语言形容全队和我内心有多失落。

阿尔及利亚人的年薪高达400万欧元，尽管克罗地亚球队只需承担一小部分，但买断后将很难全额负担。

7、国际篮联重磅官宣，中国男篮收三个好消息和三个坏消息

一条曲线特点是，涨跌跟随投入的本金比例；另一条曲线特点是，损失提前限定，收益却可能随着行情加速数倍或者更多。

而三狮军团英格兰，更是背负着长达60年的“冠军荒”。

8、河南社旗：消防宣传进社区 实操演练筑牢安全防线

但这一经历，也暴露了公司的核心短板：企业成本把控不取决于自身管理能力与技术工艺，而是高度依赖合约定价规则，自主抗风险能力偏弱。

边路双星阿什拉夫和马兹拉维攻防两端表现稳定，是球队战术体系的核心。

2026年以来，共有80家公司在A股上市，其中15家公司上市后累计涨幅超300%。

第二条路线是米兰最可能采取的方案，即直接从五大联赛挖角成名的二流中锋，靠性价比解决问题。